**Title**

Genetic selective abortion: pushing the boundaries

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**Abstract**

Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality—in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component or that may be found to be in the future. I first review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted the right to select against fetal impairment, then by parity of reasoning she should also be granted the right to choose sex selective abortion. I show that these same considerations that entail the permissibility of sex selective abortion are also applicable to genetic selection abortion. I then examine the objections to sex selective abortion that Williams considers and rejects, and show that they also lack force against genetic selection abortion. Finally, I consider some additional objections that might be raised.

**Author biography**

Bruce P. Blackshaw is a philosophy PhD student at the University of Birmingham with interests in bioethics, philosophy of science and information ethics. He is also a software entrepreneur specialising in encryption technologies.